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The Treaty for East African Co-operation:
Can East Africa Successfully Revive One
of Africa's Most Infamous Economic
Groupings?
Susan Fitzke
The developed world has historically viewed Africa as back-
ward and marginal. Recently, however, Africa has found itself
in the midst of an emergence and the focus of international at-
tention. The United States has taken an increased interest in
Africa, as evidenced by recent visits to the continent by Rever-
end Jesse Jackson as President Clinton's special envoy, Secre-
tary of State Madeleine Albright, and by President Clinton
himself, who was the first American president to visit the Afri-
can continent in over twenty years. In addition, shortly before
President Clinton's trip, the House of Representatives passed
the African Growth and Opportunity Bill, which focuses on U.S.
trade and investment in Africa.1 Politicians and multinational
corporations are beginning to recognize that African countries
have the potential to be significant trading partners in the world
market, and they are speaking of Africa "with terms such as
'trade' and 'investment' rather than 'crisis"' 2 for the first time in
decades. In fact, the United States imports more oil today from
Africa than from the Middle East,3 and the United States ex-
ports more product to Africa than to the entire former Soviet
bloc or Eastern Europe.4 Moreover, at present, trade with Af-
1. See H.R. 1432, 105th Cong. (1998).
2. Mark Suzman, A Fresh Start and Fine Sentiments, FN. TImEs, Dec. 15,
1997, at 16.
3. See R.W. Apple Jr., Clinton's Dream for Africa: Many Snags to Over-
come, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 1998, at A8.
4. See Africa in the World Economy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Africa of the House International Rel. Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of
Rosa M. Whitaker, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Africa). Critics are
quick to point out that these figures may not be as significant as they first ap-
pear, for U.S. trade with Africa accounts for only about .9 percent of all U.S.
exports and about 2 percent of all U.S. imports. Apple, supra note 3, at A8.
Additionally, this trade has traditionally been confined to a limited number of
countries. See id.
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rica supports approximately 100,000 American jobs. 5 Despite
all of its promise, however, Africa currently shares in only 1.2
percent of world trade.6 Over 260 million people in sub-Saharan
Africa live on less than one dollar a day, and many African coun-
tries have accumulated billions of dollars of foreign debt.7
Perhaps as a result of these discouraging statistics, there is
a dearth of information in the international trade literature con-
cerning sub-Saharan Africa. Scholars in this field have instead
focused their efforts on more high-profile trade agreements such
as the WTO, GATT, NAFTA, and the EU. However, this
shortage of scholarly attention is not due to a lack of activity on
the part of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, which have been
actively engaging in trade agreements since gaining their inde-
pendence in the early 1960s.
This Note discusses the potential for success of one such
agreement, the Treaty for East African Co-operation. Part I pro-
vides the necessary foundation for this discussion by describing
the economic conditions in the wider region of sub-Saharan Af-
rica. Part II examines the Treaty for East African Co-operation
as it existed in 1967 and reflects on the reasons for its collapse.
Part III analyzes the revival of the Treaty for East African Co-
operation and explains how it is functioning today. Part IV ex-
amines other regional trade agreements in the area and consid-
ers the burdens and benefits of concurrent membership.
Finally, Part V ponders the future of the Treaty for East African
Co-operation. This Note contends that, although the Treaty for
East African Co-operation is ambitious, it has the potential to
succeed as long as its members are willing to put aside historical
differences and quell internal unrest.
I. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA GENERALLY
The countries of sub-Saharan Africa 8 have been confronted
with consistently poor economic performance over the last
5. See Africa, supra note 4 (statement of Rosa M. Whitaker).
6. See African Leaders, World Bank Chief Enter Second Day of Meetings,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Jan. 24, 1998.
7. See id.
8. Sub-Saharan Africa is composed of all of the countries in Africa except
Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and South Africa (which has tradition-
ally been excluded for political reasons and is now excluded from this portion of
the analysis for economic reasons). See Faezeh Foroutan, Regional Integration
in Sub-Saharan Africa: Past Experience and Future Prospects, in NEW DIMEN-
SIONS IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION 234, 267 n. 1 (Jaime DeMelo and Arvind Pana-
gariya eds., 1993).
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twenty years. "Sub-Saharan Africa today represents the major
global challenge for those concerned about development in the
Third World."9 The per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
for the region fell by fifteen percent between 1977 and 1985.10
The countries of sub-Saharan Africa are among the poorest in
the world, possessing little human and physical capital. In
1992, twenty-four of the thirty-four countries with a per capita
income of less than $400 were located in Africa.11 In 1996, the
per capita income was only two-thirds of what it was in the early
1980s. 12 As a result of their economic weaknesses, many coun-
tries in sub-Saharan Africa are heavily dependent on the indus-
trialized world for technical and financial resources.13
One possible solution to the problems in sub-Saharan Africa
may be regional cooperation, which has the potential to improve
the economies of all of the countries involved. In 1989, sub-
Saharan countries had a combined Gross National Product
(GNP) approximately equal to that of Belgium.14 "Imagine sub-
dividing Belgium into forty-something independent countries,
each with its own isolated goods and factor markets, a different
public administration, currency, language, fiscal and monetary
authorities, army, plus a very inefficient intercountry transpor-
tation network. Economists would contend that the welfare of
individuals would surely be reduced."15 Such a duplication of
resources is expensive to maintain on many different levels. In
monetary terms, paying the administrative costs of the in-
dependent resources is much greater than if the services were
provided by one centralized government. In addition, a divided
region shrinks the tax base that pays for those resources, thus
making them more costly for everyone within the region.
A divided region is perhaps most expensive to businesses
because transaction costs increase. The businesses are forced to
deal with currency conversion, language barriers, and differing
legal standards. If instead all services and standards were con-
9. Shalendra D. Sharma, Africa's Developmental Challenges: Between De-
spair and Hope, 20 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF., Winter/Spring 1996, at 165
(reviewing RICHARD SANDBROOK, THE POLITICS OF AFRICA'S ECONOMIC STAGNA-
TION (1985) and THE POLITICS OF AFRICA'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY (1993)).
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See Ngila Mwase, Regional Economic Integration and the Unequal
Sharing of Benefits: Background to the Disintegration and Collapse of the East
African Community, 8 AFR. REV. 28 (1978).
14. See Foroutan, supra note 8, at 234.
15. Id.
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trolled by one centralized government, the costs would decrease
for all involved, including foreign and local businesses, state
governments, and consumers. Administrative agencies that
serve the same function would not have to be maintained merely
because they fell on different sides of national boundaries. Not
only would there be a larger tax base from which to pay for re-
gional resources, but those within the union could also realize
the benefits of economies of scale. Finally, the costs of doing
business in the area would greatly decrease because businesses
would be forced to deal with only one administration, one set of
standards, one currency, and one official language of business.
According to neoliberal trade theory, regional cooperation
enables the individual countries to focus on their comparative
advantage, which permits them to reap benefits from the divi-
sion of labor, specialization, and economies of scale.16 Increased
productivity, in turn, stimulates investment.17 Regional inte-
gration progresses in stages: "from free-trade area, to customs
union, common market, economic or monetary union, and, fi-
nally, to political union."18 The free market promotes coopera-
tion and integration: each country in the grouping will produce
only those goods in which it has a competitive advantage, en-
abling all goods to be produced by the most economically effi-
cient producer. Thus, all countries in the union will eventually
become dependent on each other for the production of certain
goods. This interdependence will consequently foster political co-
operation. All countries within the union then benefit from the
larger market and the more efficient allocation of resources.
Moreover, this pooling of resources and exports should increase
the region's bargaining power vis-a-vis the rest of the world and
decrease its level of external dependence. 19
However, there is some question as to whether purely mar-
ket-driven theories are appropriate solutions for the problems
facing sub-Saharan Africa today. 20 For example, the South Afri-
16. See Carol B. Thompson, African Initiatives for Development: The Prac-
tice of Regional Economic Cooperation in Southern Africa, 46 J. INT'L AFF. 125,
131 (1992).
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. See T. Ademola Oyejide & Mufutau I. Raheem, Long-Term Develop-
ment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Would Regional Integration Help?, in FROM AD-
JUSTMENT TO DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 367, 369 (Giovanni Andrea Cornia &
Gerald K. Helleiner eds., 1994).
20. "This [free market] approach has been gaining momentum with the
proposed monetary union of the E.C. It is becoming the singular model pro-
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can Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) 21 rejected
the linear development process suggested by neoliberal trade
theory. Instead, the SADCC promoted a "development integra-
tion" approach to regional cooperation. 22 This approach advo-
cates close political cooperation at early stages of the integration
process, equity balancing among the member states, and re-
gional industrial planning with regional resource mobilization.
23
The equity balancing requirement ensures that investment and
economic growth do not occur exclusively in the most developed
country of a region to the detriment of all others.24 Advocates of
this approach are skeptical about the ability of a free market to
deal with wealth inequalities between states, preferring a more
hands-on approach to integration. They also believe that a polit-
ical federation is a necessary prerequisite to economic integra-
tion, rather than an inuring benefit. The main thrust of this
theory is that wealth inequalities may be corrected through pref-
erential treatment for less developed countries, redistribution of
investments and investment earnings, and tariffs or trade re-
striction policies.25
Over the past thirty years, the countries of sub-Saharan Af-
rica have been experimenting with different trade theories, and,
posed, no matter how different conditions in Africa of the 1990s are from those
of Europe in the 1950s." Thompson, supra note 16, at 131.
21. The members of the SADCC included Angola, Botswana, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
The SADCC was "a loose association of states with a quasi-legal personality."
Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, August 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 116. The goals of the SADCC were to facilitate economic development in
the member states, ensure their independence from South Africa, and promote
the integrated development of the region. The members of the SADCC formal-
ized their relationship in a Treaty. See id. at 117. The SADCC members signed
the Treaty of the South African Development Community in 1992. See id. at
116. The Treaty created the South African Development Community (SADC),
which has replaced the SADCC. See id.
22. Id. at 117.
23. See id. at 124-25.
24. See Horacio A. Grigera Naon, Sovereignty and Regionalism, 27 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1073, 1077-78 (1996). This problem was aptly described by
Ngila Mwase:
Common [M]arkets between partner-states with geographical proxim-
ity, but differing levels of economic development, not to mention struc-
tural and ideological differences, have brought distributional problems
of benefits, with the lion's share accruing to the partner able to attract
more investments, i.e. with greater economies of scale, both internal
and external; better infrastructure both physical and social; a higher
level of industrial growth, etc.
Mwase, supra note 13, at 28.
25. See Naon, supra note 24, at 1078.
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perhaps as a result of varying regional integration efforts, sub-
Saharan Africa has shown signs of improvement. In 1996, Afri-
can economies experienced growth of five percent, the highest
rate in two decades. 26
II. THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY
One of the earliest attempts at integration on the African
continent occurred in East Africa. The roots of the East African
Community (EAC) have been traced as far back as 1902, when
an administrative organization was established to foster British
interests in Tanganyika and the Zanzibar Protectorate (now
Tanzania), the Uganda Protectorate, and the Colony of Kenya. 2 7
The British used this early version of the EAC to regulate trade,
transportation, and communication within Kenya. 28 In 1948,
the British colonial administration created the East African
High Commission (EAHC) to serve largely the same ends. 2 9
These early common market structures enabled Great Britain to
easily exploit the colonies. 30 The colonial administration gave
Kenya a position of predominance, and most of the major indus-
tries in East Africa were located in Nairobi. 3 1 This led to une-
ven levels of development not only in the industrial sector, but
in the service and trade sectors as well.3 2 Thus Kenya became
the "center of the Periphery" in East Africa, while the economic
structures of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania became intertwined
and interdependent. 33
In the post-colonial era, the close ties between Kenya,
Uganda, and Tanzania remained intact because the countries'
leaders realized that losing the common market structures that
26. See Tony Hawkins, Can African Economies Sustain Their Recovery?:
The World's Poorest Continent Must Attract Global Capital to Maintain Eco-
nomic Growth, FIN. TIMES, May 14, 1997, at 9. This growth trend is likely to
taper off in the following year with a slowdown in the dollar price of oil and
unfavorable weather conditions in Southern and Eastern Africa. See id.
27. See Aggrey Awori, Seeking Regional Economic Cooperation in Africa,
46 J. INT'L AFF. 119, 120 (1992).
28. See id.
29. See Cooperation Treaty, 30 AFR. RES. BULL.: ECON., FIN. & TECHNICAL
SERIES, No. 11, Nov. 16 - Dec. 15, 1993, at 11484.
30. See P. Godfrey Okoth, The Foreign Policy of Uganda Since Indepen-
dence Toward Kenya & Tanzania, in POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION IN EAST AF-
RICA 359, 361 (Walter 0. Oyugi ed., 1994).
31. See id.
32. See Korwa G. Adar & Mutahi Ngunyi, The Politics of Integration in
East Africa Since Independence, in POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION IN EAST AF-
RICA 395, 412 (Walter 0. Oyugi ed., 1994).
33. Okoth, supra note 30, at 361.
[Vol. 8:127
1999] THE TREATY FOR EAST AFRICAN Co-oPEI ATioN 133
had been built during the colonial period would be costly. 34 In
1967, the three countries entered into a treaty formally estab-
lishing the East African Community (EAC). 35 Although the
main focus of the Treaty was economic, it went further than all
previous agreements in the area by undertaking to integrate the
politics, as well as the common services, of the member
countries. 36
The stated goal of the Treaty for East African Co-operation
was regional integration, and Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania all
publicly espoused the notion that they entered the Treaty for
mutual gain. However, in truth, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania
were all seeking to protect their own varying national interests.
While administered by Great Britain, the Kenyan economy had
become dependent on foreign capital. 37 Therefore, after inde-
pendence, in order to maintain its prominence within the region,
Kenya needed to retain export outlets for its goods and serv-
ices. 38 Tanzania, which viewed itself as a net loser under the
previous trading scheme, sought to achieve a more balanced di-
vision of the gains from trade within the region.39 Tanzania also
had an ideological commitment to African unity40 and saw the
EAC as a stepping stone toward Pan-Africanism. 4 1 Finally,
Uganda supported the EAC because it wanted to formalize its
relationship with Kenya.4 2 Due to its landlocked position,
Uganda was dependent on Kenyan ports, and Uganda wanted
freer access to the Kenyan market for its agricultural prod-
ucts. 4 3 In addition, Uganda, like Tanzania, wanted to improve
34. See Reginald Herbold Green, The East African Community: A Valedic-
tion Forbidding Mourning, 8 AvR. REV. 1, 3 (1978).
35. See Treaty for East African Co-operation, June 6, 1967, 6 I.L.M. 932.
36. See Cooperation Treaty, supra note 29, at 11484. The Preamble of the
Treaty for East African Co-operation states that in "their desire for the wider
unity of Africa [the three countries] are resolved to co-operate with one another
and with other African countries in the economic, political and cultural fields."
Treaty for East African Co-operation, supra note 35, 6 I.L.M. at 938. However,
despite this broad policy statement, the leaders of Kenya, Uganda, and
Tanzania could not reach an agreement on political federation, and nothing fur-
ther was discussed in the Treaty about how the three countries planned to inte-
grate their politics beyond the proposed economic cooperation. See Adar &
Ngunyi, supra note 32, at 401. Therefore, the Treaty for East African Co-oper-
ation really focuses on economic integration. See id.
37. See Okoth, supra note 30, at 364.
38. See Green, supra note 34, at 3.
39. See id.
40. See Okoth, supra note 30, at 364.
41. See Green, supra note 34, at 3.
42. See id.
43. See id.
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its overall position within the region and achieve more equality
in the distribution of benefits from trade and industry within the
region.44
A. THE STRUCTURE OF THE TREATY
The main objective of the Treaty for East African Co-opera-
tion was the establishment of an East African Common Market.
It provided for a common external customs tariff,45 and it lim-
ited the ability of member states to enter into trade agreements
that would give them tariff concessions not available to the other
members. 46 Within the union, the Treaty prohibited internal
tariffs47 and quantitative restrictions on East African goods.48
The Treaty also provided that once a customs duty had been
charged on a foreign good by any member state, no further cus-
toms duties could be imposed on the transfer of that good to an-
other member state.49 The Treaty stated that those goods would
enjoy unrestricted freedom of transit throughout the territory.5 0
In order to facilitate the success of an East African Common
Market, the Treaty for East African Co-operation sought to
bring Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania to the same level of devel-
opment.51 To serve this end, the Treaty institutionalized a sys-
tem of unequal sharing of benefits.5 2 This system had four main
components:
(a) a system of transfer taxes on manufactured goods entering inter-
state trade imposable by a partner state sustaining a deficit in its
trade with the other partner-states,
(b) the East African Development Bank (EADB) with its differential
investment formula (22 1h per cent of the funds to be invested in
Kenya and 38 3/4 per cent in each of the other two partner states),
(c) the "decentralization" of the Community institutions hitherto con-
centrated in Nairobi, [and]
(d) harmonization of fiscal and monetary incentives. 5 3
44. See Okoth, supra note 30, at 365.
45. See Treaty for East African Co-operation, supra note 35, art. 5, 6 I.L.M.
at 941.
46. See id. art. 7, 6 I.L.M. at 941.
47. See id. art. 11, 6 I.L.M. at 944.
48. See id. art. 12, 6 I.L.M. at 945.
49. See id. art. 9, 6 I.L.M. at 942-43.
50. See id.
51. See Mwase, supra note 13, at 31.
52. See id.
53. Id.
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1. The transfer tax
The system of transfer taxes54 was one of the main provi-
sions of the Treaty intended to help cure the unequal levels of
development among the three countries. It allowed a less devel-
oped partner state with a trade deficit in manufactured goods
within the union to impose a transfer tax on manufactured
goods that originated from one of the other partner states.
55
The value of the tax imposed on the manufactured goods was not
to exceed the amount of the trade deficit in manufactured goods
between the shipping state and the receiving state.5 6 However,
the transfer tax could only be applied when the receiving state
produced, or intended and had the capacity to produce within
three months, the same or functionally similar goods.5 7 The
main goal of the transfer tax was to protect, for a period not to
exceed fifteen years, local industry in Uganda and Tanzania.
58
The theory behind the tax was that it would encourage indus-
trial development in Uganda and Tanzania by making imports
into those protected markets more expensive.5 9 The limited pe-
riod of protection was thus intended to aid industry in Uganda
and Tanzania in reaching Kenya's level of development. They
could protect certain industries for a period of time while the
industries grew and established themselves. Then, when the
protective barriers were removed, the industries in Uganda and
Tanzania would be able to compete on an even footing with
Kenyan industry.
2. The East African Development Bank
The East African Development Bank's (EADB)60 main pur-
pose was to provide financial and technical assistance to the
54. See Treaty for East African Co-operation, supra note 35, art. 20, 6
I.L.M at 949.
55. See id. art. 20 subd. 3, 6 I.L.M. at 950.
56. See id. art. 20 subd. 4, 6 I.L.M. at 950.
57. See id. art. 20 subds. 6-7, 6 I.L.M. at 950-51.
58. See Mwase, supra note 13, at 38. Under the Treaty, Kenya was not
afforded the right to impose a transfer tax on goods coming from Tanzania or
Uganda. To be afforded the right to impose a transfer tax, the partner state
was required to have a trade deficit in manufactured goods with the other two
states, and Kenya always had a large trade surplus. See id.
59. See id.
60. Article 21 of the Treaty for East African Co-operation established the
East African Development Bank, and Article 22 provided that the charter of the
bank would be set out in Annex VI. Treaty for East African Co-operation, supra
note 35, arts. 21-22, 6 I.L.M. at 956.
35
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member states in order to promote development. 61 Moreover,
the EADB sought to equalize the level of industrialization be-
tween Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania 62 and make their econo-
mies more complementary in the industrial field.6 3 To further
this end, the Treaty for East African Co-operation included a
provision requiring the EADB to invest 38 3/4% of its money in
both Uganda and Tanzania and the remaining 22 1/2% in
Kenya.64
3. Decentralization
The Treaty for East African Co-operation contained provi-
sions relating to the decentralization of Community corporations
and provided for several common services to be administered by
the Community.65 Treaty members argued that moving some of
the Community's institutional headquarters out of Nairobi
would aid in achieving an equitable distribution of gains.66
Thus the Treaty directed that the headquarters of the East Afri-
can Railways and East African Airways corporations would be
located in Kenya,67 while the East African Harbors corporation,
as well as the headquarters of the EAC, were to be located in
Tanzania.68 Finally, the East African Telecommunications cor-
poration and the East African Development Bank were to be lo-
cated in Uganda.69 In addition to the major corporations, there
was to be an East African Customs and Excise department, an
East African Income Tax Department, a Directorate of Civil Avi-
ation, and an East African Meteorological Department.70
4. Fiscal and monetary policies
Finally, the Treaty contained provisions intended to harmo-
nize the fiscal and monetary policies of the member states. It
stated that Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania were required to use
61. See id. Annex VI, art. l(l)(a), 6 I.L.M. at 1003.
62. See id. Annex VI, art. 1(1)(b)&(c), 6 I.L.M. at 1003.
63. See Mwase, supra note 13, at 36.
64. See Treaty for East African Co-operation, supra note 35, Annex VI, art.
13(c), 6 I.L.M. at 1010.
65. Article 86 of the Treaty states that the Community's aim is to decen-
tralize the functions of the community in accordance with the measures set
forth in Annex XIV. See id. at art. 86, 6 I.L.M. at 988.
66. See Adar & Ngunyi, supra note 32, at 402.
67. See Treaty for East African Co-operation, supra note 35, art. 87, 6
I.L.M. at 988.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id. Annex XIV, Part A, 6 I.L.M. at 1054-55.
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their best efforts to adopt a common scheme of fiscal incentives
towards industrial development. 71 Additionally, the Treaty re-
quired the three countries to strive to conform their fiscal poli-
cies and pursue economic policies designed to equalize their
balance of payments and maintain confidence in their curren-
cies. 72 These measures were intended to help place Kenya,
Uganda, and Tanzania on secure economic footing and make
transactions between them easier and thus more numerous.
B. ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WITH THE TREATY
Notwithstanding the comprehensive nature of the Treaty,
several weaknesses soon became apparent:
(a) The Treaty did not guarantee the free movement of labour among
the partner states; thus making it more of a Customs Union than a
Common Market,
(b) The transfer tax as an internal levy represented a selective devia-
tion from internal free trade and therefore violated the Common
Market ideal of absence of internal trade restrictions,
(c) Despite the transfer tax and the EADB, the Treaty did not provide
for any central means of industrial allocation or a common scheme
of fiscal incentives, . . . [and]
(f) The coordination of some vital matters of the Community were left
to the Councils, often without specific guidelines.
7 3
However, perhaps the biggest failing of the EAC was that the
attempts at decentralization "did not significantly change the
old pattern of sharing benefits," 7 4 with Kenya receiving more
than it contributed. 75 The Community headquarters were for-
mally spread out, but Kenya remained the center for many of
the Community's functions.7 6 Because Kenya had the most de-
veloped infrastructure and an established business community,
as well as a central location relative to the other two states, it
continually received the largest share of the expenditures made
by the common services and benefited from the employment pro-
71. See id. art. 19, 6 I.L.M. at 949.
72. See id. art. 27, 6 I.L.M. at 958.
73. Mwase, supra note 13, at 31.
74. Id. at 32.
75. See id. at 46.
76. See id. at 32. For example, the headquarters of East African Telecom-
munications was located in Kampala, Uganda, yet the "nerve center" of the or-
ganization remained in Nairobi. See id. The East African Harbors Corporation
was located in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; however, the port of Mombassa,
Kenya continued to handle about twice as many ships as Dar es Salaam and
made improvements to its port with money from the East African Harbors Cor-
poration. See id.
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vided by them.77 Therefore Kenya maintained its position of
predominance in the region and continued to control trade
within the EAC. 78 Between 1969 and 1978, Kenya controlled
76.6 percent of the intra-EAC exports; this made Kenya the only
net exporter in the region.79 During the same period, approxi-
mately 81 percent of Uganda's total intra-EAC trade consisted of
imports from Kenya.80
Another problem for the struggling EAC emerged in the ad-
ministration of the common services. All corporations were in-
tended to be East African property wherever they were located,
but in practice they never were.81 Some of the Community cor-
porations sustained heavy losses and required support by the
state in which they were headquartered.8 2 This contributed to
the desire of each state to run its own affairs.8 3 Moreover, the
EAC failed to regulate effectively the transport system.8 4 Dis-
putes arose between the three nations over an increased use of
road transportation by Kenya. Tanzania and Uganda felt that
the increased road transportation in Kenya would exclusively
benefit Kenyan industries to the detriment of the jointly owned
public railway system.8 5 Tanzanian officials were also upset
about a new trade route that had developed between Kenya and
Zambia, causing heavy trucks to continually cross Tanzania.8 6
Tanzania paid the price to maintain the roads, while Kenya
reaped all of the benefits from the trade.87 This dispute actually
led Tanzania to close its border to Kenya's heavy vehicles before
the general border closure in 1977.88
C. A POLITICAL IMPOSSIBILITY?
Some of the greatest weaknesses of the EAC were political.
The Treaty for East African Co-operation created the East Afri-
77. See Arthur Hazlewood, The End of the East African Community: What
are the Lessons for Regional Integration Schemes?, in THE FUTURE OF REGIONAL-
ISM IN AFRICA 172, 177 (Ralph I. Onwuka & Amandu Sesay eds., 1985).
78. For a detailed description of trade flows within the EAC, see Adar &
Ngunyi, supra note 32, at 403-09.
79. See id. at 404.
80. See id.
81. See Mwase, supra note 13, at 32.
82. See Okoth, supra note 30, at 372.
83. See id.
84. See Mwase, supra note 13, at 42.
85. See Hazlewood, supra note 77, at 179.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
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can Authority (the Authority) to perform the executive functions
of the Community.8 9 The Authority was composed of the presi-
dents of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, 90 and the ultimate con-
trol of the EAC was vested in the Authority.91 No proposal could
be passed if one of the three heads of state objected to it.92 Each
of the presidents had an effective veto power over the actions of
the Authority, so "[t]he success of the system was ... dependent
on the harmonious relationship among the Presidents. '93 How-
ever, the Treaty failed to include a conflict resolution mecha-
nism to deal with disputes that would arise between the member
states.94 As a result, the differing political ideologies of the lead-
ers within the union limited what the EAC could accomplish.
When the Treaty for East African Co-operation was signed
in 1967, Kenya believed it followed a nineteenth-century capital-
ist pattern of development, with some state intervention. 95
However, Tanzania thought Kenya fostered inegalitarianism at
home and exploitation regionally. 96 In 1967, Tanzania believed
it was in transition to socialism, but Kenya and Uganda viewed
Tanzania as dangerously leftist.97 The political ideology of
Uganda was less clear, but it appeared to fall somewhere be-
tween Kenya and Tanzania on the political spectrum.98 These
differences existed when the EAC was formed in 1967, and they
continued to grow thereafter, making a political federation
impossible. 99
89. See Treaty for East African Co-operation, supra note 35, arts. 46 & 48,
6 I.L.M. at 965-66.
90. See id. art. 47, 6 I.L.M. at 965.
91. See Adar & Ngunyi, supra note 32, at 402.
92. See Treaty for East African Co-operation, supra note 35, Annex XI, 6
I.L.M. at 1036.
93. Adar & Ngunyi, supra note 32, at 402.
94. See id. at 401.
95. See Green, supra note 34, at 19.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id. "Kenya's capitalism became more elitist.... Uganda's decision
makers [were] increasingly viewed by Tanzania and Kenya as a band of erratic,
technically incompetent, 'security' payment collectors. Tanzania - like Kenya -
has tended to pursue the trends evident in 1967, thus... widening the Kenya/
Tanzania divergence of ideology...." Id. 19-20.
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Despite these weaknesses, many initially viewed the EAC
as a success. 100 The EAC was one of the most advanced inte-
gration processes of its time:10 '
Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania had convertible currencies, unitary
services, and common educational and economic policies.... The East
African Court of Appeals served as the highest court for the three coun-
tries.... In more than one way, the East African Community exhibited
a higher level of integration than even that of the EEC. 10 2
Unfortunately, this success did not last long. Between 1968 and
1971, the EAC held several meetings; however, these gatherings
ceased in 1971 due to competition and inequities within the
union and the Idi Amin coup in Uganda. 0 3 Throughout the
1970s, the EAC existed in name only. It was plagued by ineffi-
cient resources, a lack of leadership, and political disputes be-
tween the three countries.10 4 This political unrest actually
resulted in Tanzania and Uganda going to war in 1972 and
1979.105
When the EAC collapsed in 1977, Kenya, Uganda, and
Tanzania "lost over sixty years of cooperation and the benefits of
economies of scale.' 0 6 The three states were forced to establish
independent services and industries which had previously been
provided on a regional level.'0 7 This was done at great expense
and with a loss of efficiency.108 The difficulties faced by the EAC
were aptly summarized by Dr. Ngila Mwase, a scholar who has
written extensively about the EAC:
The adoption of the Treaty did not remove the differences in attitudes
(of mind, to say the least) to socialism and capitalism, to the great so-
100. See Awori, supra note 27, at 119.
101. See P. Kenneth Kiplagat, Legal Status of Integration Treaties and the
Enforcement of Treaty Obligations: A Look at the COMESA Process. 23 DENV.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 259, 277 (1995).
102. Id.
103. See Ngila Mwase, The African Preferential Trade Area: Towards a
Sub-Regional Economic Community in Eastern and Southern Africa, 19 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 622, 623 (1985).
104. See Awori, supra note 27, at 120. After 1971, there could be no more
meetings between the three leaders because President Julius Nyerere of
Tanzania refused to speak to Idi Amin, the militant dictator who usurped power
in Uganda. See Michela Wrong, Interview: the Executive Secretary of the Secre-
tariat of the Commission for East African Co-operation: United by a Common
Policy: Ambassador Francis Muthaura Explains How the New Community Will
Work, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1996 at 6.
105. See id.
106. P. Kenneth Kiplagat, Jurisdictional Uncertainties and Integration
Processes in Africa: The Need for Harmony, 4 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 43, 49
(1995).
107. See id.
108. See id.
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cialist and capitalist powers, to the non-citizens, to the organization of
economic life in the town and countryside, etc. The Treaty offered the
possibility of making common economic decisions at E.A.C. levels, an
attempt to make different economic systems co-exist without ill-effects,
which, as things turned out, was impossible.1 0 9
In April 1977, the EAC collapsed, seemingly for good, under the
weight of its own internal stress.110
III. THE EAST AFRICAN COOPERATION:
THE EAC REVIVED
It is of little surprise that the EAC is making a comeback in
this era of renewed stability in East Africa. 1 - "The countries of
East Africa have many things in common and share similar his-
torical experiences that make them natural candidates for inte-
gration,"1" 2 and they all have the potential to gain from it.
Uganda has a comparative advantage in agriculture and the
power sectors but is landlocked. 11 3 Tanzania is rich in minerals
and has energy potential but is poor, and Kenya has well-devel-
oped manufacturing and service sectors but is energy defi-
cient. 114 In recognition of these factors, Presidents Moi of
Kenya, Mwinyi of Tanzania, and Museveni of Uganda signed the
initial protocols to revive the Treaty for East African Co-opera-
tion in Arusha, Tanzania on November 30, 1993.115 This move
revived the defunct East African Community under the new
name of East African Cooperation (still known as EAC). In
March 1996, a secretariat was created which officially re-estab-
lished the EAC.1 16 The role of the Secretariat of the EAC is to
109. Mwase, supra note 13, at 48-49.
110. See Mwase, supra note 103, at 623.
111. See id. The Executive Secretary of the Commission for East African
Co-operation, Francis Muthaura, stated:
The ministers who signed the dissolution agreement [for the EACI
wept. It was the worst thing that ever happened to this region and
from that day the economies started to decline. Since 1977 there's
been a realisation (sic) that renewed co-operation is inevitable. The
whole world is forming regional trading blocs. Either we do the same
or we sink.
Wrong, supra note 104, at VI.
112. Kiplagat, supra note 106, at 50.
113. See Sub-Saharan Africa, BARcLAY's ECON. REV., First Quarter 1997, at
29.
114. See id. at 29-30.
115. See Cooperation Treaty, supra note 29, at 11483.
116. See Michael Holman, Learning from the Past: East Africa's Three Pres-
idents are Preparing Their Countries for Economic Integration, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
5, 1996, Survey, at 47. The two and a half year delay between the signing of the
treaty and the establishment of the secretariat was due to disputes between
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carry out the decisions made by the leaders of Kenya, Uganda,
and Tanzania under the auspices of the EAC. 1" 7 The current
agreement is scheduled to be upgraded into a formal treaty in
November 1998.118
One of the main objectives of the EAC is to eliminate all
internal tariffs by the year 2000." 9 In an attempt to reach this
goal and foster the success of the revived EAC, Kenya, Uganda,
and Tanzania set up a Tri-partite Commission for Coopera-
tion.1 20 The Tri-partite Commission will be responsible for pro-
moting cooperation on political, economic, social, cultural, and
security fronts.1 21 The Tri-partite Commission is currently ex-
amining impediments to interstate trade and looking for ways to
bring the three countries closer together. 22 The establishment
of the Tri-partite Commission has paved the way for greater
communication and closer relations between the members of the
EAC.
During the past two and a half years, the EAC has been
very active in its integration efforts. On April 29, 1996, Presi-
dents Moi of Kenya, Mkapa of Tanzania, and Museveni of
Uganda introduced a common internal passport to be used by
their combined population of approximately eighty million. 23
At the same ceremony, the three leaders inaugurated a flag to
represent the EAC. 124 In addition, on March 6, 1997, the three
heads of state signed a memorandum of understanding which
established a framework for cooperation in the area of capital
markets development. 125
The revived EAC has found success in other areas as well.
The three currencies are freely convertible,' 2 6 the finance minis-
Presidents Moi and Museveni. See East Africa Tries Again, FOREIGN REP., No.
2447, May 15, 1997, at 6.
117. See Secretariat Launched, 33 AMFR. RES. BULL.: ECON., FIN. & TECHNI-
CAL SERIES, No. 3, May 14, 1996, at 12511.
118. See Draft Treaty Launched to Revive East African Community, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, May 15, 1998.
119. See East African Countries Work for Closer Integration, XINHUA NEWS
BULL., August 29, 1997.
120. See id.
121. See Cooperation Treaty, supra note 29, at 11483.
122. See The Test of Practicality, E. AFR., Sept. 25, 1997.
123. See East Africa Launches Economic Plan, ALL AFRICAN PRESS SERVICE,
May 6, 1997.
124. See id.
125. See Capital Markets Development, 34 AFR. RES. BULL.: ECON., FIN. &
TECHNICAL SERIES, No. 3, MAY 6, 1997, at 12959.
126. See Convertible Currencies, 33 AFR. RES. BULL.: ECON., FIN. & TECHNI.
CAL SERIES, No. 6, Aug. 8, 1996, at 12615.
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ters are trying to coordinate their budgets, and they are harmo-
nizing their banking policies and taxation schemes. 127 The EAC
is also in the process of reviving the Court of Appeals of East
Africa. 128 In addition, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania reached
an agreement on transportation that will improve the condition
of the roads and synthesize the laws and practices of the three
countries regarding market access and ports of entry.1 29 The
EAC is also currently considering an agreement relating to com-
munications systems.1 30 On the social front, the EAC is discuss-
ing a common school curriculum for East Africa,13 1 a regional
woman's organization, 132 and cooperation in health care,' 33 in-
cluding AIDS research.' 34
IV. A BRIEF LOOK AT OTHER REGIONAL INTEGRATION
EFFORTS IN EAST AFRICA
The EAC is not the only regional integration effort in sub-
Saharan Africa, nor is it the only trade agreement to which
Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania are parties. Following the col-
lapse of the original EAC, the states of Eastern and Southern
Africa created many similar regional organizations aimed at in-
tegration.135 For example, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania are
all members of the African Economic Community (AEC) and the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).
However, the resulting diversity of organizations, many with
overlapping membership, can create serious legal and jurisdic-
tional problems.' 36
127. See East Africa Tries Again, supra note 116, at 6.
128. See EAC Sets to Revive Court of Appeal, XINHUA NEWS BULL., Oct. 24,
1997.
129. See E. Africa Reaches Pact on Road Transport, XINHUA NEWS BULL.,
Sept. 7, 1997.
130. See East Africa Tries Again, supra note 116, at 6.
131. See Single School Curricula Proposed for East Africa, XINHUA NEWS
BULL., Sept. 12, 1997.
132. See East Africa Plans Regional Women's Organization, XINHUA NEWS
BULL., Oct. 8, 1997.
133. See East African Coop in Health Urged, XINHUA NEWS BULL., Sept. 24,
1997.
134. See East Africa to Coop in Aids Research, XJNHUA NEWS BULL., Sept.
26, 1997.
135. See Kiplagat, supra note 106, at 43.
136. See generally id. at 44 (describing several regional organizations on the
African continent and examining potential jurisdictional problems and their ef-
fects on regional economic integration).
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A. THE AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
The Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the United
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) have devel-
oped a "grandiose plan to bring the African continent closer to
an African Economic Community by the year 2000."' a3 All of the
members of the OAU are parties to the Treaty Establishing the
African Economic Community, 138 (AEC Treaty) which came into
force June 3, 1991. The stated goals of the Treaty and the Afri-
can Economic Community are to foster economic, social, and cul-
tural integration on the continent.139 Moreover, the Treaty
seeks to balance economic development on a continental level. 140
The AEC Treaty purports to accomplish these goals by focusing
on the development of economically self-reliant industrial sec-
tors in each member country. 141 The Treaty hopes to bring local
production up to a point where each country is equally able to
engage in trade on a continental level. 142
Unfortunately, the lofty goals of the AEC are out of reach,
judging from the current state of integration on the continent. 143
This becomes apparent when one considers the current status of
the EAC. The EAC consists of only three countries sharing a
long history of cooperation and interdependence, but they have
been thus far unable to integrate fully and appear unlikely to
complete the integration process by the year 2000. It is in this
context that the near impossibility of the AEC's goal of creating
an African Economic Community by the year 2000 comes into
perspective. The difficulties in defining and coordinating the
137. Id. at 44.
138. Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, June 3, 1991,
30 I.L.M. 1241 [hereinafter AEC Treaty]. Signatories to the AEC Treaty in-
clude: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Cote D'Ivoire, Dji-
bouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,
Sahrawi, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tchad, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire (Republic of
the Congo), and Zimbabwe. Id. Preamble, 30 I.L.M. at 1249-50.
139. See id. at 1251. See Naon, supra note 24, at 1127-32 for a more com-
plete discussion of the goals and inter-workings of the AEC Treaty.
140. AEC Treaty, supra note 138, Preamble, 30 I.L.M. at 1249-50.
141. See Naon, supra note 24, at 1127. This development theory is contrary
to the neoliberal (free-market) approach traditionally thought by Western econ-
omists to be the most effective way toward economic integration. See supra
notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
142. See Naon, supra note 24, at 1127.
143. See Kiplagat, supra note 106, at 44 n.1.
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economic and social policies of forty-nine countries are
enormous.
However, the AEC should not be so quickly dismissed as a
failure. Its vision is inspiring, and it may help to shape and
change attitudes toward integration on the continent. The sig-
natories recognized that the Treaty's goals were ambitious, as
they provided for a thirty-four year implementation period to
take place in six stages.1 44 The organization's inability to meet
preliminary and arbitrary deadlines should thus not condemn
the entire project. Finally, the AEC has a unique decision-mak-
ing process in which the Assembly of Heads of State and Gov-
ernment 145 and the AEC Council' 46 have the authority to "make
supranational regional law that is directly and immediately
binding on the AEC member countries.' 47 This has been
viewed "as a significant step toward reducing the sovereign in-
terference in the adoption of community decisions that plagues
other African international economic integration programs.'
48
144. See AEC Treaty, supra note 138, art. 6, 30 I.L.M. at 1254.
145. See id. art. 8, 30 I.L.M. at 1256.
The Assembly is the supreme organ of the AEC: it determines and im-
plements general AEC policy, issues directives, and coordinates and
harmonizes the economic, scientific, technical, cultural, and social poli-
cies of member countries. It also oversees the functioning of AEC's
other organs .... Assembly decisions are adopted by consensus (or,
failing that, by the vote of two-thirds of the AEC members) and become
automatically enforceable thirty days after they are signed by the As-
sembly's president. Assembly decisions are binding on both member
countries and AEC organs.
Naon, supra note 24, at 1129.
146. See AEC Treaty, supra note 138, art. 13, 30 I.L.M. at 1258.
The AEC Council is composed of the ministers of the member countries
and is responsible for the functioning and development of the commu-
nity. The Council makes recommendations to the Assembly on any ac-
tion necessary to attain AEC objectives. It acts by issuing regulations
that are binding on member countries, subordinate organs of the AEC,
and regional economic communities after having been approved by the
Assembly. If the Assembly has delegated its decision-making powers
in a given area to the AEC Council, regulations issued by the AEC
Council become binding immediately. Regulations are automatically
enforceable thirty days after they are signed by the chairman of the
Council. Regulations proposed by the [Clouncil are adopted by consen-
sus (or, failing that, by a two-thirds majority of the member countries).
Naon, supra note 24, at 1129-30.
147. Id. at 1130.
148. Id.
145
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B. THE COMMON MARKET FOR EASTERN AND SOUTHERN
AFRICA
In addition to the EAC and AEC, Kenya, Uganda, and
Tanzania are all parties to the Treaty Establishing the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. 149 Like the AEC,
COMESA was also adopted with lofty goals. However, in May
1997, these great ambitions were scaled down to focus on the
creation of a free trade area among the member states by the
year 2000150 and a customs union with a common external tariff
by 2004.151 The other overlapping regional organizations within
COMESA, such as the EAC and the AEC, should aid in this pro-
cess. The COMESA Treaty contains a provision requiring that
COMESA members provide all other member states "most fa-
vored nation" treatment.15 2  This provision specifies that
COMESA members may not enter into preferential trade agree-
ments with non-member states unless they offer the same con-
cessions to all COMESA members on a reciprocal basis. 153
Hence, the COMESA process will be aided by other regional
groupings. As COMESA members reduce tariffs to comply with
other treaty obligations, they are forced under the terms of the
COMESA Treaty to offer the same terms to all COMESA
members.
However, with just over one year left in which to reach their
goals, it is unlikely that the twenty diverse countries involved in
COMESA will be able to effectuate a free trade area by the year
2000. Several of the individual countries involved in COMESA
have suffered political turmoil and social unrest. In addition,
COMESA itself has been plagued by internal friction. The Sec-
retary General of COMESA was suspended in early 1997 for al-
149. See Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa, Nov. 5, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1067 [hereinafter COMESA Treaty]. The origi-
nal parties to the COMESA Treaty included Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Dji-
bouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Id. Preamble, 33 I.L.M. at 1072.
Mozambique, Lesotho, and Namibia have since withdrawn from the Treaty.
See Secretary-General Suspension, 34 AFR. RES. BULL.: ECON., FIN. & TECHNI-
CAL SERIES, No. 1, March 10, 1997, at 12880.
150. See COMESA Targets African Free Trade Area by Year 2000,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, May 13, 1997.
151. See Executive Secretary Dismissed, 34 AFR. RES. BULL.: ECON., FIN. &
TECHNICAL SERIES, No. 4, June 2, 1997, at 12993.
152. See COMESA Treaty, supra note 149, art. 56, 33 I.L.M. at 1084.
153. See id. See also supra note 21.
[Vol. 8:127
1999] THE TREATY FOR EAST AFRICAN Co-oPERATIoN 147
legedly mismanaging the organization's funds.' 54 Around the
same time, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Namibia withdrew from
COMESA in order to focus their energies on another regional
grouping, the Southern African Development Community.155
Despite these problems, COMESA members have achieved
significant tariff reductions.' 56 Total intra-COMESA trade has
increased from $834 million in 1985 to $2.4 billion in 1995.157
Once again, the inability of COMESA to meet its arbitrarily set
target dates should not be viewed as a failure of great conse-
quence for the goals of the regional trade regime.
C. CONCURRENT MEMBERSHIP
Some may question why Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania
would want to be members of the EAC, AEC, and COMESA con-
currently. After all, involvement in multiple organizations can
be costly because it leads to the duplication of resources and con-
comitantly high administrative costs.' 5 8 It also creates uncer-
tainties for businesses, raising the cost of maintaining
operations in the area.' 59 Businesses are forced to consider the
benefits and liabilities involved in doing business in a particular
country by looking at its membership in various trade re-
gimes.' 60 A "trader will have to identify, among other things,
the dispute resolution regime that will apply to the contract, the
currency and payment procedure, and the percentage of local
value added to the product entitling it to preferential treatment
.... These requirements make trading with [a] region difficult
and inefficient.' 16 ' Additionally, competing legal standards may
make it impossible for a country to comply fully with all of its
international obligations.' 62
Moreover, countries face problems of forum-shopping as
businesses search out the most favorable judicial climate in
154. See Secretary-General Suspension, supra note 149, at 12880.
155. See id.
156. Zimbabwe, Uganda, Mauritius, Kenya, Sudan, and Comoros have
made eighty percent tariff reductions, whereas most other COMESA countries
have reduced tariffs between sixty to seventy percent. See COMESA Targets
African Free Trade Area by Year 2000, supra note 150.
157. See COMESA Calls for Removal of More Barriers to Boost Trade,
XINHUA NEWS BULL., Feb. 2, 1998.
158. See Kiplagat, supra note 106, at 50. See also supra note 13.
159. See Kiplagat, supra note 106, at 51.
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 50.
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which to litigate their claims. 163 Each treaty regime generally
sets out its own dispute resolution scheme. Therefore, if a coun-
try is a member of more than one trade regime with jurisdiction
over the dispute, the entity seeking to challenge that country's
trade policies can raise its claim in whichever jurisdiction gives
it the best chance of prevailing. However, disputes normally
may only be adjudicated under the auspices of a regional organi-
zation if the dispute arises under the treaty which the entity is
seeking to use to enforce its position. 164 For example, one coun-
try cannot adjudicate a dispute regarding access to another
country's ports under the auspices of a treaty that does not pro-
vide for the rights of access sought. Finally, even if a favorable
judgment is secured through the dispute resolution scheme of
one treaty, that judgment is only enforceable against the mem-
bers of that treaty. 165 Each treaty regime exists independently
of all others, and there are no vertical enforcement
mechanisms. 166
Nonetheless, concurrent membership in regional trade
agreements does provide some advantages. Integration pools
the collective resources of a region and creates larger mar-
kets. 167 The costs of doing business in that region are thereby
decreased. 168 Decreased costs, in turn, draw investment, 169
strengthening weak individual economies and making them via-
ble as a regional market.170 This is especially important in the
context of sub-Saharan Africa, where most of the individual
countries have economies that are too small to draw effectively
outside investment or compete in the world market.
However, the larger the trade union, the more competing
ideologies to accommodate. The benefits of belonging to smaller
regional groupings are apparent: when there is a smaller
number of members in a regional grouping, it is easier to come
to a consensus on complicated issues such as tariff reductions.
Logically, it is possible to make larger tariff reductions more
quickly when it is only necessary to get three treaty members to
163. See id. at 51.
164. See id. at 53.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 56.
168. See id.
169. "The attraction to potential investors is that a wider market is gener-
ated by integration which in turn lowers marginal input costs by increasing
outputs." Id.
170. See id.
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agree rather than twenty or thirty. Therefore, members of
smaller trade agreements can share increased benefits from free
trade among themselves while they strive to negotiate larger
trade agreements.
The members of the EAC have an additional incentive to be
a part of COMESA because of South Africa. South Africa is a
large, wealthy market with a relatively high standard of living,
and EAC members can produce many goods more cheaply than
South Africa. 171 In addition, the members of the EAC have an
advantage over other African countries in trade with South Af-
rica due to what the South Africa Foundation Director, Paul
Runge, calls "comfort zones" for South African businessmen.' 72
The EAC and South Africa share the English language, main-
tain similar banking systems, and ship frequently between
themselves.' 73 The EAC therefore has the potential to develop a
favorable and productive trading partnership with South Africa.
However, the emergence of South Africa may not be all good
news for the EAC. Kenyan businessmen have accused South Af-
rica of using unfair trade practices to close off the South African
market to Kenyan goods.' 7 4 Additionally, the well-developed
South African economy may lead to a flood of South African
goods throughout the region which have been expensive or diffi-
cult to get. 175 This is both a potential benefit and a potential
detriment to the members of the EAC. They will have greater
access to goods that were previously out of reach, or produced at
a great cost; however, they may face declining terms of trade
with South Africa as South African exports increase throughout
the region. In either case, the members of the EAC cannot af-
ford to ignore the presence of such a dynamic economic force in
the region.
V. THE REVIVED EAC'S POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS
Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania have taken steps to try to
ensure that history will not repeat itself and that the EAC will
prosper as a regional organization. In this endeavor, they have
171. See id. at 60.
172. See Claire Pickard-Cambridge, East Africa the Leader in Trade With
the South, Bus. DAY (S. AFR.), Jan. 19, 1998, at 3.
173. See id.
174. See Kenyan Exporters Complain About High South African Tariffs,
XINHUA NEWS BULL., Nov. 17, 1997.
175. See Kiplagat, supra note 106, at 59. South African exports have greatly
increased in Kenya and Tanzania, especially in steel, plastics, paper pulp, and
vehicles. See New Trade Flows, INmAN OCEAN REV., March 2, 1996, at 708.
49
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found some initial success. 176 However, the EAC still faces sev-
eral formidable challenges that must be addressed if it is to be a
successful and enduring trade regime.
One of the biggest problems facing the EAC today is the re-
cent behavior of Tanzania where "a listless bureaucracy contin-
ues to constrain growth."' 77 Tanzania is the poorest of the EAC
members, and there is an increasingly prevalent belief amongst
Tanzanians that the country is being marginalized and becom-
ing a dumping ground for Kenyan goods.' 78 In July 1997,
Tanzania suspended all COMESA preferential tariffs, including
those on imports from Kenya and Uganda.179 This angered offi-
cials in Kenya who worry that without preferential tax breaks,
Kenyan products cannot compete in Tanzania. 8 0 Kenyan offi-
cials also worry that, even if the preferential tariffs are rein-
stated, it may take a long time for Kenya to regain its
competitive advantage in Tanzania.18' Tanzanian officials
maintain that this measure is only a means of eradicating
abuses and strengthening its tax collection structure. 8 2 Fur-
thermore, they contend that all future COMESA preferential
tariffs will be the result of bilateral agreements between the
member country, the individual companies within that country,
and the Tanzanian government.'8 3 This is not the method by
which preferential trade agreements are to be instituted under
COMESA or the EAC, where preferential tariffs are created
within the context of multilateral negotiations between member
countries. Although this move by Tanzania was taken under the
guise of COMESA, it has noticeably affected the EAC. It has
been viewed as a significant obstacle to the EAC's goal of elimi-
nating all tariff and non-tariff barriers by the year 2000.184 The
recent actions taken by Tanzanian leaders cast doubt on their
commitment to integration, for the leaders appear more con-
cerned with self-protection than with regional promotion.
176. See supra notes 115-18, 123-34 and accompanying text.
177. Holman, supra note 116, at 47.
178. See Michela Wrong, Mediation Brings Rewards: The Poorest of the
Three Countries has a Per Capita Income of Just $120, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1996,
Special Section, at 2.
179. See Jackson Okoth, Kenya Wants Review of Dar's Suspension of
COMESA Tariffs, E. AFR., July 14, 1997.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id.
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Perhaps the greatest obstacle faced by the EAC is the insta-
bility that has relentlessly plagued East Africa over the last
thirty years. Political stability is a prerequisite to economic
growth. Without stability, coherent economic policies cannot be
designed and implemented on a national basis, and govern-
ments do not have the requisite legitimacy to negotiate mean-
ingful agreements. Kenya, historically the most stable country
in the region, is currently dealing with a level of civil unrest
rarely seen.' 8 5 This is worrisome to the other members of the
EAC because "[sitability and growth in Kenya are essential to
the development of the region."1 8 6 The Kenyan economy is the
largest and most developed in East Africa, and its size and level
185. Citing massive corruption, the IMF suspended its $215 million aid
package to Kenya in June 1997. See Michael Holman, Kenya Faces 'Lost Year'
in Growth and Investment: Drought, Flood, and Economic Mismanagement
Point to Tough Time in 1998, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1997, at 4. This came amidst
rashes of election violence during which more than one hundred people died.
See Rift Valley Troubles, 35 AFR. RES. BULL.: POL., Soc. & CULTURAL SERIES,
Mar. 20, 1998, No. 2, at 13015. The presidential elections were finally held on
December 29-30, 1997, and President Moi, who has ruled Kenya for the past
nineteen years, won the election, but not without controversy. Voting in Kenya
takes place largely along ethnic lines, and there were reports of ethnic violence
which forced several tribes from their homes at the time of the election, thereby
disenfranchising them. See Close Shave, 39 AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, No. 1, Jan. 19,
1998, at 4. Kenyan law allows its citizens to vote only in their home district, so
the displacement of these tribes enabled key districts to go to Moi. See id.
There were also problems with voter registration which prevented many
Kenyan citizens from exercising their right to vote. See December Election
Date, 34 AFR. RES. BULL.: POL., Soc. & CULTURAL SERIES, No. 11, Dec. 31, 1997,
at 12894. Moreover, there were widespread claims of vote rigging and reports
that some polls did not open at all. See Close Shave, supra at 4.
It must be noted that, even without the fraud and irregularity, Moi would
still likely have won the election due to favorable election laws and because the
opposition candidates were too ethnically divided for any one of them to have
garnered a majority of the votes. See December Election Date, supra at 12894.
Following the elections, the violence that had plagued Kenya over the previous
year did not quickly cease. The most notable was the sweeping ethnic violence
that occurred in the Rift Valley Province, where the Kalenjin Tribe attempted
to "cleanse" the area of the Kikuyu living there.
In addition to the political mayhem, 1998 is projected to be a bleak eco-
nomic year for Kenya. It is unlikely that Kenya will experience even a 2%
growth in GDP in 1998, while the budget deficit is expected to almost double.
See Holman, supra at 4. Part of the reason for this dim outlook is that Kenya
has been struggling to recover from severe flooding caused by the weather phe-
nomenon known as El Nifio, which devastated the country's agricultural sector.
In addition, Kenya is still struggling to recover from the loss of tourism it exper-
ienced last year when ethnic conflicts swept Mombassa during the height of the
tourist season. See id.
186. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Afr. of the House Comm. on Interna-
tional Aff., 105th Cong. 11 (July 30, 1997)(Testimony of U.S. Ambassador Wil-
liam Twaddell).
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of industrialization are a big draw for investors. If Kenya is not
able to maintain stability and control its political situation, it
will hurt the entire region. Investors will stop investing in
Kenya and current businesses operating in the country will
likely pull out or shut down. Uganda and Tanzania will not ben-
efit from any capital withdrawal from Kenya because they will
lose the benefits of having these businesses located within the
EAC. It is also unlikely that foreign investors will relocate to
Uganda or Tanzania because, without Kenya as a trading part-
ner, their relative economies are too small to draw any substan-
tial investment. Uganda and Tanzania could continue to trade
among themselves, but at their current level of development the
relative gains would be small. Thus political stability in Kenya
is essential, not only to the success of the EAC, but also to the
economic welfare of the entire region.
Despite its current peaceful and prosperous appearance,
Uganda is another possible area of instability.187 Since the coup
that left Museveni in power in 1986, the international commu-
nity has been content to let Uganda function as a one-party
state.188 This has enabled Uganda to be more stable and more
187. Uganda is peaceful in relative terms; however, in Northern and West-
ern Uganda, sporadic military conflicts continue. See Museveni's Backyard:
Sweeping Changes in the Region Have Not Ended the Rebellions Against
Kampala, 38 AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, No. 16, Aug. 1, 1997, at 4; T.V. Sathy-
amurthy, Uganda's Political System 1962- 1990: The Balance Between External
and Internal Influences, in POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION IN EAST AFRICA 503,
503-04 (Walter 0. Oyugi ed., 1994).; Uganda: Rebel Activity, 34 ARF. RES.
BULL.: POL., Soc. & TECHNICAL SERIES, Mar. 24, 1997, at 12588.
188. Uganda is not a de jure one-party state since rival political parties are
not themselves banned, but Uganda is fumctionally a one-party state because
when Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) took power in
1986, they banned all party activities. See Holger Bernt Hansen & Michael
Twaddle, Uganda: The Advent of No-Party Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND
POLITICAL CHANGE IN SuB-SAHARAN AFRICA 137, 142-43 (John A. Wiseman ed.,
1995). This ban on party activities is codified in the 1995 Uganda Constitution,
which prohibits all party activities, including opening and operating branch of-
fices, holding delegates' conferences, sponsoring candidates for election, and
staging political rallies. See Adonia Ayebare, Uganda Parties Bill is Ready for
Parliament, E. AFR., Mar. 24, 1998. President Museveni has responded to criti-
cism of this system by stating that, once the constitution-making system allows,
the people of Uganda will decide whether or not to return to a multi-party polit-
ical system. See Hansen, supra at 143. However, Museveni believes that
Uganda is not yet ready for multi-partyism because the country is still too di-
vided by tribe and religion. See Ayebare, supra. According to the Ugandan Con-
stitution, the people of Uganda will be able to vote in the year 2000 on whether
or not to have a multi-party democracy. See Hugh Dellios, In Africa, Seeds of
Hope Take Root, CHI. TRIB., March 22, 1998, at C1. However, even if this vote
takes place, it is not likely to be successful because supporters of multi-party-
ism are not currently allowed to organize to get their message across, and the
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prosperous than it has been since gaining independence in
1962.189 However, Uganda cannot remain a one-party state for-
ever; eventually Uganda will face pressure from the interna-
tional community to democratize and allow rival political parties
to exist.' 90 Once this happens, the potential for violence in
Uganda will greatly increase, as evidenced by the events in
neighboring Kenya over the past seven years. Kenya had been
pressured by the international community in 1991 to move from
a one-party state to a multi-party democracy.' 91 Following the
repeal of Amendment 2A of the Kenyan Constitution, which le-
galized one-partyism, a rash of violence erupted in the Rift Val-
government is continually spreading the message that political parties are evil.
See id. Perhaps in recognition that the referendum is likely to fail, multi-party
advocates have been calling for a boycott of the referendum, stating that "polit-
ical parties represent a fundamental right of association." Ayebare, supra.
189. The international community is ever mindful of Uganda's checkered
political past and therefore is especially apprehensive to pressure Uganda into
a political system that the county may not yet be equipped to handle. See Del-
lios, supra note 188.
The United States has faced a lot of criticism for its current policy toward
Uganda, which supports Museveni but places little or no pressure on him to
democratize his country. The official United States stance is that, while it still
advocates democracy, it recognizes that Uganda is fragile, and the United
States is pleased by the peace and stability that Museveni has brought to his
nation. See id.; James C. McKinley, Clinton in Africa: The Region; A New
Model for Africa: Good Leaders Above All, N.Y. TIMES, March 25, 1998, at A14.
One American official stated that as long as Uganda shows a willingness to
keep working toward democracy, America can live with them. See McKinley,
supra at A14. He said that it was not a double standard, but a different stan-
dard based on historical context. See id. Critics of this American policy have
disagreed and stated that a double standard is exactly what it is. Those critics
suggest that the United States and the rest of the international community
have continued to support Museveni, not because he is making progress to-
wards democracy, but because he believes in free markets and cooperated with
the World Bank in restructuring the Ugandan economy. See Dellios, supra note
188, at C1. The critics also point out that on President Clinton's recent visit to
Africa, he visited Uganda, not Kenya, despite the fact that Kenya has a much
more advanced democracy and is a traditional Western ally. See McKinley,
supra at A14. They argue that this decision was made on economic grounds
because President Moi has done a poor job managing Kenya's economy, which is
rampant with corruption. See id. These critics are left questioning just how
deep America's commitment to democracy really runs. See id.
190. While the United States has been complacent and has allowed
Museveni to run his country unilaterally with little criticism in the past, it has
intimated that this arrangement will not be indefinitely acceptable. See Del-
lios, supra note 188, at C1.
191. In November 1991, the IMF suspended a large portion of Kenya's one
billion dollars a year in foreign aid. See SIMON BAYNHAM, KENYA: PROSPECTS
FOR STABILITY 2-3 (1997). In order to get the aid reinstated, Kenya moved to a
multi-party system of democracy. See id.
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ley Province that lasted until 1993, during which thousands of
people were killed.192
Despite this struggle, Kenya continues to function essen-
tially as a one-party state. 193 Although the repeal of Amend-
ment 2A did allow for multi-party elections, the constitutional
amendments that were enacted accomplished little. 194 This ten-
sion has not yet been resolved, and the recent violence in Kenya
is a direct result of Kenya's struggle to achieve full and fair elec-
tions. 195 It is perhaps fortunate for Uganda that the interna-
tional community has shown little interest in meddling in
Uganda's internal politics at the current time.196
The internal weaknesses inherent in Uganda's current one-
party political system present another danger for the country.
The system that has developed is heavily dependent on
Museveni and his personality.' 97 If something were to happen
to him, the stability of the nation would be in jeopardy. 9 8 There
would likely be a violent power struggle in Uganda because
Museveni is the unifying force in Ugandan politics. His popular-
ity and support cross ethnic lines, and, at the moment, there is
no clear successor nor an effective democratic system in place
with the order, stability, and legitimacy to replace Museveni
peacefully.
The current one-party political system in Uganda is also
vulnerable due to the growing desire among the Ugandan popu-
lous to participate in party politics. This was particularly evi-
dent during the last round of elections in Uganda, when the
National Resistance Movement (NRM) 199 began to show signs of
weakness. Despite the ban on party activity, multi-partyist
Nasser Sebaggala defeated a NRM candidate to become the new
192. See Rift Valley Troubles, supra note 185, at 13015.
193. See KIVUTHA KIBWANA, SOWING THE CONSTITUTIONAL SEED IN KENYA,
139 (1996). "The ghost of section 2A, very much like colonialism, continues to
rule us from the grave." Id.
194. See Kivutha Kibwana, One Year After Multi-Party Elections: Whither
Patriotism, Democracy and Kenya, in IN SEARCH OF FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN EAST AFRICA 311, 318 (Kivutha Kibwana et al.
eds., 1996).
195. See note 185.
196. See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
197. See A Strategic Partner, BUSINESS DAY (S. AFRICA), Jan. 28, 1998, at
11.
198. See id.
199. The National Resistance Movement (NRM) is the name of the armed
movement that brought Museveni to power in 1986. See Hansen & Twaddle,
supra note 188, at 142.
[Vol. 8:127
1999] THE TREATY FOR EAST AFRICAN Co-oPERA4 TIoN 155
Mayor of Kampala, the capital city of Uganda. 200 Moreover, in
open defiance of the law, opposition groups have recently begun
staging meetings and selling party cards. 20 ' Indeed, it appears
as though the NRM's dominance has begun to wane.
Uganda, whose debt service today exceeds its foreign ex-
change earnings, 20 2 can ill-afford another civil war. Despite its
rapid growth of late,20 3 the Ugandan economy is still roughly
half of what it was before Idi Amin took control of the country in
1971.204 However, all hope is not yet lost. Uganda has the abil-
ity to learn from Kenya's mistakes. Additionally, after thirty
years of unrest, most Ugandans are happy to be finally living in
peace and enjoying the resulting prosperity. Perhaps in this pe-
riod of calm, Uganda will be able to create institutions and
structures to ensure a smooth transition to multi-partyism.
Moreover, President Museveni has many broad regional
goals,20 5 and he is a very different leader than President Moi. It
is possible that his motivations are purer and he will not sacri-
fice what is best for the country in order to maintain power.
The long-term success of the EAC will primarily depend on
three factors: regional stability, equitable sharing of benefits
among member nations, and ideological unity. As previously
discussed, stability is essential for economic growth. If one of
the EAC members were to slip into civil war, the legitimate gov-
ernment would likely be too consumed with domestic turmoil to
worry about any international or regional obligations that it
may have. Domestic production, transportation, and communi-
cations would also be disrupted, making business expensive, if
not impossible. Kenya is currently the most volatile country in
the region. Although mass protests and politically motivated vi-
olence have decreased since the elections in December 1997,
Kenya still suffers from ethnic violence and civil unrest. More-
200. See James Tumusiime, Museveni Slams Ministers for Meddling in LC-
V Elections, THE MONITOR, April 22, 1998. In the wake of the election results,
President Museveni was quick to point out that Kampala has always been a
weak spot for the NRM. See id.
201. See Michela Wrong, Party Spirit Seems to be Returning, FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 1998, at 3.
202. See Sharma, supra note 9, at 166.
203. Since 1987, the Ugandan economy has sustained an impressive annual
growth rate; it has been growing six percent annually, and it grew over eight
percent in the year ending June 1996. See Michael Holman, Recovery is Contin-
uing Apace: After its Remarkable Revival, Uganda Needs to Expand its Export
Base, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1996, Special Section, at 3.
204. See Holman, supra note 116, at 47.
205. See Dellios, supra note 188, at Cl.
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over, an economically tough year is predicted for Kenya in 1998,
and the IMF refuses to reinstate Kenya's $215 million loan
package which it revoked in July 1997 due to mass corruption in
the government. The Kenyan people have been energized and
mobilized by the events of the past year, and questions remain
about how long they will be willing to live in poverty while Presi-
dent Moi's regime continues to mismanage and pilfer from the
country.
Uganda also finds itself in a precarious position. While ex-
periencing more stability and economic success than it has since
independence, Uganda is not completely free of armed
skirmishes. Moreover, Uganda's days as a one-party state
under Museveni are numbered. Uganda must find a way to
make a peaceful transition to multi-partyism.
Despite the delicate situations in Kenya and Uganda, peace
will most likely prevail in the region. Kenya escaped a threat to
its stability late in December 1997, when it was able to hold its
national elections amid strong pressure from opposition groups
and escalating violence. Although admittedly flawed, the elec-
tions have been recognized by the international community and
have provided Kenya with a ruler for the next five years. Fol-
lowing the 1992 elections, there was a rash of ethnic violence
which slowly faded away. The ethnic violence currently plagu-
ing Kenya appears likely to do the same, as it has significantly
subsided since the December 1997 elections. As for the situation
in Uganda, there is reason to believe that it too will work out
peacefully. Uganda will eventually, in one way or another, be
forced to democratize. However, after three decades of civil war,
it is unlikely that Ugandans will launch headlong into another
conflict. In addition, President Museveni currently enjoys wide-
spread popular support that crosses ethnic lines. The armed
skirmishes in the north and west of Uganda are primarily due to
the instabilities in neighboring Sudan and the Republic of Congo
(formally Zaire), and they are unlikely to engulf the entire
country.
The second factor that will be essential to the ultimate suc-
cess of the EAC is its ability to deal effectively with the unequal
sharing of benefits within the union. Kenya continues to domi-
nate intra-EAC trade, and Tanzania remains dissatisfied with
its gains from trade. If the Treaty administration is unable to
deal with these problems, Tanzania and Uganda would probably
not view their membership in the EAC as beneficial, and the
Treaty may once again collapse. In an attempt to promote equal
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development, the EAC has restructured the ownership of com-
munity resources. The 1967 version of the EAC provided for
joint ownership of regional enterprises which soon led to dis-
putes among Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, as each became
possessive of the resources located within its borders. 20 6 Under
the revived EAC, there will be no joint ownership of enterprises.
Instead, the aim is "to create an enabling environment for busi-
ness," concentrating on the harmonization of policies, but the
key actors will be private.20 7 Under this system, each country is
encouraged to develop and promote the resources located within
its own boundaries. This restructuring should not only provide
incentives for industry to enter the area, but also for it to dis-
perse throughout the region, as the benefits of doing business
solely in Nairobi should dissipate. Eventually, each country will
share equally in the benefits of development and
industrialization.
Perhaps the most significant factor that will contribute to
the success of the revived EAC is ideological unity; the countries
in the region are no longer "divided by rival ideologies and differ-
ent economic policies." 208 The governments of Kenya, Uganda,
and Tanzania all currently share a market-oriented form of gov-
ernment and similar economic policies. 20 9 In addition, all three
countries are in the midst of a move towards privatization and
liberalization, which has been essential to the integration pro-
cess. 210 This has led to a decrease in foreign exchange controls
and a profound improvement in the investment climate. 211
"[T]he most important factor in any economic organization,
especially on the African continent, has always been the political
element. Without that political will, no economic organization,
especially of a regional nature, can survive. '212 The alignment
of political ideologies in the 1990s has fostered a meaningful dia-
logue between Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania for the first time
since the late 1960s. This has made possible not only the re-
establishment of the EAC, but also the developments which
have occurred under its auspices.2 13 However, the re-establish-
206. See Holman, supra note 116, at 47; see also supra notes 81-83 and ac-
companying text.
207. Holman, supra note 116, at 47.
208. Holman, supra note 116, at 47.
209. See id.
210. See Sub-Saharan Africa, supra note 113, at 29.
211. See Holman, supra note 116, at 47.
212. Awori, supra note 27, at 120.
213. See supra notes 115-18 & 123-34 and accompanying text.
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ment of the EAC has unfortunately not progressed without tur-
moil. The first attempts to revive the EAC occurred in
November 1993, when the initial protocols were signed, but dis-
putes between Presidents Moi of Kenya and Museveni of
Uganda prohibited a secretariat from being established until
March 1996.214 The EAC exists today primarily due to the will
of President Mkapa of Tanzania, who used all of his negotiating
skill to get the secretariat in place while working as a diplomat
prior to his presidency. 215 Thus it is important not only that the
political ideologies continue to move in the same direction, but
also that the three leaders are able to put personal differences
aside for the good of the Treaty.
V. CONCLUSION
The EAC is an ambitious integration proposal, but it has
the potential to be a great success whether or not it meets its
goal of eliminating all internal tariffs by the year 2000. The
original version of the Treaty confronted civil war and the polit-
ical imperatives of trying to accommodate the wishes of a capi-
talist, a communist, and a militant dictator. The EAC exists
today in a very different political climate, as Kenya, Uganda,
and Tanzania are all relatively peaceful, sharing a market-ori-
ented form of government and promoting similar economic poli-
cies. As a result, a meaningful dialogue has been possible
between these three countries for the first time in two decades.
This dialogue has led not only to the revival of the EAC but also
to the agreements that have been reached under its auspices.
In essence, "[by co-operating the three nations could boost
their share of world trade. Competing, they may all lose."2 16
The members of the EAC are currently on the right track toward
achieving many of their ambitious goals. They will be aided in
this endeavor if they view other regional organizations, such as
the AEC and COMESA, as allies in their quest, rather than com-
petition. The ultimate success of the EAC will depend heavily
on the events of the next ten years. If the Treaty administration
is able to deal effectively with the unequal levels of development
among the three countries, and the region remains peaceful, the
214. See East Africa Tries Again, supra note 116, at 6.
215. See id.
216. Michela Wrong & Anthony Goldman, Co-operation not Competition: To
Exploit its Potential to the Full, East Africa Needs to be Offered as a Single
Destination, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1996, at VI.
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EAC has the potential to be one of the most advanced, inte-
grated, and successful markets in the world.

